This morning, William Samuel Johnson (Conn.), Rufus King (Mass.), and John Lansing (New York) were among the group of delegates taking the short walk from the City Tavern at 2nd and Walnut to the State House on Chestnut, between 5th and 6th streets. The air is cleaner and cooler, brought on by an easterly wind. 

Resolving once again into the Committee of the Whole, the delegates heard first from John Lansing, who called for considering the first resolution of both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans. They are fundamental to the debate, he said, and involve “principles directly in contrast; that of Mr. Paterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it.” Randolph’s plan (the Virginia Plan), he continued, “absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects of worthy of the supreme cognizance.” Lansing prefers Paterson’s plan, grounding his objections to the Virginia Plan chiefly on the Convention’s lack of authority to propose such sweeping changes and the “improbability of it being adopted.”

Repeating a constant theme in days past, Lansing insisted “New York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the convention if she had supposed the deliberations would turn on a consolidation of the States,” which they “had never been authorized to propose.” 

Speeches were fewer and longer today, much of the time consumed by Paterson expounding on the justification for the New Jersey Plan and James Wilson countering him. Declaring his intent to avoid repetition as much as possible, Paterson immediately reinforced Lansing’s assertion that the New Jersey Plan, unlike the Virginia Plan, is consistent with the authority given to the Convention by the Congress. Moreover, he “came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me.” They did not send him to deny equality to the States and subordinate them to a national government.

“If a proportional representation be right,” he queried, “why do we not vote so here?” The current Articles of Confederation give each State an equal vote and require that any alteration of the Articles requires unanimous consent. “What is unanimously done,” he declared, “must be unanimously undone.” Earlier in these debates, he recalled, Wilson had observed that when the Articles were originally proposed, “the larger States gave up the point [of proportional representation], not because it was right, but because of the circumstances of the moment…Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back? Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee?”

Paterson also questioned the need for two branches of the legislature. “Why?” he asked. In a federation of equal States, the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Besides, the expenses of such a national government would be too great a burden.

Finally, Wilson stood to respond, carefully contrasting the two plans, point by point. 

Virginia Plan	New Jersey Plan
1. Legislature with two branches	Legislature with one brance
2. Based on authority of the people	Based on authority of the States
3. Representation according to numbers and importance	Representation of the States without regard to numbers
4. A single executive magistrate	More than ome executive magistrate
5. A majority empowered to act	A small minority able to control
6. National legislature to legislate in all cases to which the State legislatures are incompetent or in which the harmony of the Union may be interrupted	United States in Congress vested with additional powers only in a few inadequate instances
7. To negative laws contrary the Union or treaties	To call forth power of the confederate States in order to compel obedience
8. Executive removable after Impeachment and conviction	Executive removable by Congress on application of a majority of State executives
9. Executive qualified veto	No executive veto
10. Inferior tribunals	No inferior national tribunals
11. Ratification by conventions	Ratification by the State legislatures

Next, Wilson began to elaborate on the differences. “With regard to the power of the convention,” Wilson added, he conceived himself “authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing.” With regard to the sentiments of the people, how can we know them? “Those of the particular circle in which one moves, are commonly mistaken for the common voice,” he concluded. Besides, “why should a national government be unpopular? Will each citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a citizen of the United States?” [Italics in the original.]

Wilson was relentless. “Is there no danger of legislative despotism?” he exclaimed. “If the legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability. It can only be restrained by dividing it within itself,” by a bicameral legislature. “In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one of the virtue and good sense of those who compose it.” Next, Wilson declared, “in order to control the legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to control the executive, you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues.” 

“Having taken so much time,” Wilson yielded the floor. Debate will resume Monday morning.