The Convention appears to be making progress. Small State delegates are more secure since achieving equality of representation in the Senate. Relieved, they have become more engaged in deliberations on other subjects. Disagreement is no stranger to the East Room of the State House, but the intensity of distrust and suspicion has dissipated noticeably. Additionally, secrecy and reconsideration of issues already decided are proving to be useful rules, making it easier for delegates to modify or even change their positions, as necessary.
Gouverneur Morris even admitted that “his own opinion has been changed by the arguments used in the discussion” of whether the executive should be subject to impeachment. Originally opposing impeachment, in part because it would “render the executive dependent on those who are to impeach,” he is now sensible of its necessity.” The executive may be bribed, he might corrupt the electors who chose him, and he might become incapacitated. All of these are valid reasons for impeachment. Morris added to his change of position by recommending that cases for impeachment be enumerated and punishment for corrupting electors or incapacitation be limited to removal from office.
George Mason undoubtedly affected Morris’s change of position. “No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued,” he asserted. “Shall any man be above justice?” Benjamin Franklin had also weighed in, agreeing with Mason. Impeachment “would be the best way to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.” William Davie insisted that if impeachment is not available, the executive could “spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected.”
Arguments for impeachment are far outweighing those against. For Edmund Randolph, “the propriety of impeachment is a favorite principle; guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the military force, and in some respects the public money, will be in his hands.” Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and insurrection.” Madison agreed, but said “loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the republic.”
The arguments against impeachment are straight forward but few. North Carolina’s Charles Pinckney believes the legislature would hold impeachment “as a rod over the executive and by that means effectually destroy his independence.”
On the question “shall the executive be removable on impeachment,” only Massachusetts and South Carolina voted “no.”
The ratio of electors for appointing the executive was discussed yesterday, but further consideration was postponed until today. Oliver Ellsworth had proposed that “electors be appointed by the State legislatures – one for each State not exceeding 200,000 inhabitants; two for each about that number and not exceeding 300,000; and three for each State exceeding 300,000.”
As soon as the motion was read, Elbridge Gerry offered his own motion which would allot electors to the States in following ratio: New Hampshire – 1; Massachusetts – 3; Rhode Island – 1; Connecticut – 2; New York – 2; New Jersey – 2; Pennsylvania – 3; Delaware – 1; Maryland – 2; Virginia – 3; North Carolina – 2; South Carolina – 2; and Georgia – 1.”
Immediately, Ellsworth moved that two electors be allotted to New Hampshire and Georgia. Additionally, “some rule ought to be pursued,” he advised. Jacob Broom and Luther Martin wanted the ratio to be submitted to a committee but were defeated. New Jersey’s William Houston then seconded Ellsworth’s motion, which failed 3 – 7.
Hoping to avoid a spat over how many electors would be allotted to each State, Hugh Williamson offered a simple, practical solution: accept Gerry’s proposal for the first election of the executive and “in future elections…the number of electors to be appointed by the several States shall be regulated by their respective numbers of representatives in the 1st branch.” The motion passed 6 – 4.
The Convention also approved a motion by Gerry and Morris that “the electors of the executive shall not be members of the national legislature, nor officers of the United States, nor shall the electors themselves be eligible to the (supreme) magistracy.”
Finally, the delegates voted for the executive “to receive fixed compensation to be paid out of the national treasury, prompting James McClurg to ask whether the Convention should determine “the means by which the executive is to carry the laws into effect.” Is he “to have a military force for the purpose,” he asked, “or to have the command of the militia, the only existing force that can be applied to that use?” The answers to these questions will be referred to a committee.
Virginia’s James McClurg is among the most distinguished physicians in the United States, receiving his medical degree from the University of Edinburgh and completing additional studies in Paris and London. His father, Walter McClurg, was a surgeon in the British Navy before the Revolution. James followed in his footsteps as a surgeon in the American navy and Director of Hospitals for Virginia’s military forces in 1777. When Patrick Henry refused appointment to the Convention, McClurg was recommended by Madison. “Having never appeared before in public,” Pierce observed, “his character as a politician is not sufficiently known, but he is a gentleman of great respectability and of a fair, unblemished character.”